

Remarks

Claims 1-21 are pending in the current application. Claims 11 and 18 have been amended. No claims have been canceled.

Claims 1-21 have been rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(e) as being anticipated by Floman et al., U.S. Pat. No. 6,684,324 (“Floman”).

The Office Action fails to present a prima facie case of anticipation for Applicants’ claims. “[F]or anticipation under 35 U.S.C. 102, the reference must teach *every aspect* of the claimed invention ...” MPEP 706.02 (emphasis added). “The identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as contained in the ... claim.” *Richardson v., Suzuki Motor Co.*, 868 F. 2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Floman simply fails to disclose every aspect of the claimed invention.

Applicant respectfully traverses these rejections because the cited references do not disclose or suggest every element of any claim, as the following analysis shows.

CLAIM 1

Regarding Claim 1, Floman at least fails to teach “wherein the second processor is capable of initiating the wireless communication independently of the first processor” as claimed in Claim 1.

The Advisory Action asserts that “wherein the second processor is capable of initiating the wireless communication...” is taught in Column 4, lines 32-36. Applicant respectfully points out that Floman only discloses that the second processor *can*

communicate with a mobile communication network.” This is not the same as *initiating* a wireless communication. Further, the Advisory Action ignores the phrase “*independently of the first processor*.” As stated above, for anticipation under 35 U.S.C. 102, the reference must teach *every aspect* of the claimed invention. Every aspect of the claimed invention is simply not taught by Floman.

The Final Office Action dated May 25, 2004 asserts that this limitation of Claim 1 is taught in figure 1 and column 4, lines 1-22 of Floman. Here, Floman teaches two processor blocks that each control their functions separately. (See Floman, column 4, lines 14-16) Controlling functions separately is not the same as initiating a wireless communication independently. Although Floman discloses that the second processor block includes a radio and can communicate with a mobile communication network, (See Floman, column 4, lines 32-36), Floman does not teach that the second processor block initiates a wireless communication independent of the first processor. In fact, throughout columns 4-8, Floman does not teach initiating any wireless communication.

In columns 9-11 (Examples 2 and 3), Floman teaches downloading of data to the first and second processors. Downloading data to one of the processors is not the same as initiating a wireless communication. Floman does not teach that the first or second processor initiates a wireless communication independently.

Accordingly, for at least the foregoing reasons, Floman fails to teach the limitations of Claim 1. The rejection of Claim 1 is thus unsupported, and must be withdrawn. Claims 2-10 depend from allowable Claim 1 and are allowable for at least this reason.

CLAIM 11

Regarding Claim 11, Floman at least fails to teach “an input port to receive data from a user” that is coupled to both an application subsystem and a wireless subsystem as claimed in Claim 11.

The Final Office Action dated May 25, 2004 asserts that an input port is taught by elements 8a, 8b of Floman. Elements 8a and 8b are an interface between two processors, not an input port to receive data from a user. Floman teaches user interfaces UI1 and UI2 to receive data from a user, but each is separately connected to a processor. Neither UI1 nor UI2 is connected to both an application subsystem and a wireless subsystem. (See Floman, column 4, lines 45-57.)

Accordingly, for at least the foregoing reasons, Floman fails to teach the limitations of Claim 11. The rejection of Claim 11 is thus unsupported, and must be withdrawn. Claims 12-17 depend from allowable Claim 11 and are allowable for at least this reason.

CLAIM 18

Regarding Claim 18, Floman at least fails to teach “providing data to an application subsystem from a user through an input port” and “providing data to a wireless subsystem from a user through the input port” as claimed in Claim 18.

The Final Office Action dated May 25, 2004 asserts that such an input port is taught by figure 1 and column 4, lines 1-22 of Floman. Floman teaches user interfaces UI1 and UI2 to receive data from a user, but each is separately connected to a processor.

- Neither UI1 nor UI2 is connected to both an application subsystem and a wireless subsystem. (See Floman, column 4, lines 45-57.)

Accordingly, for at least the foregoing reasons, Floman fails to teach the limitations of Claim 18. The rejection of Claim 18 is thus unsupported, and must be withdrawn. Claims 19-21 depend from allowable Claim 18 and are allowable for at least this reason.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that the application is in condition for allowance, and indication of allowance by the Examiner is respectfully requested. If the Examiner has any questions concerning this application, he or she is requested to telephone the undersigned at the telephone number shown below as soon as possible. If any fee insufficiency or overpayment is found, please charge any insufficiency or credit any overpayment to Deposit Account No. 02-2666.

Respectfully submitted,

Intel Corporation

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